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PRIVATE RAP SHEET OR PUBLIC RECORD?
RECONCILING THE DISCLOSURE OF
NONCONVICTION INFORMATION UNDER
WASHINGTON'S PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND
CRIMINAL RECORDS PRIVACY ACTS
Lynette Meachum
Abstract: Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals misapplies Washington's
Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA) in determining whether entire files of police
investigative information should be available for public review. The plain text and legislative
history of the CRPA indicate that the Washington State Legislature intended the CRPA to
apply only to the disclosure of criminal history record information, or the data that appears on
a subject's criminal rap sheet. Washington courts should interpret the CRPA narrowly, as an
exemption to the broad policy of disclosure established by the state's Public Disclosure Act
(PDA). This approach would reconcile the two statutes in a manner consistent with
Washington State Supreme Court precedent. This Comment argues that the Washington State
Supreme Court should curtail Division I's improper application of the CRPA. Specifically,
the court should declare that for records subject to public disclosure, the overlap between the
CRPA and PDA requires agencies to redact nonconviction criminal history record
information while disclosing the remaining record.
Late one night, two police officers respond to a 911 call from an off-
duty police officer's home in Western Washington.1 The officer's wife
runs outside to meet them, holding her head in obvious pain. Neighbors
watching the scene are not surprised at the police's arrival-they have
considered calling 911 when they have overheard previous fights
between the couple escalate. The neighbors are, however, surprised
when the officers depart after a few minutes and leave the couple alone
for the night. One neighbor wonders whether the officers mishandled the
events of the evening because a fellow law enforcement officer was
involved. The neighbor requests the officers' investigative reports from
the police department under Washington's Public Disclosure Act
(PDA).2 The chief of police refuses to release the reports. The chief
informs her that the department forwarded the case to the county
prosecutor, who declined to charge the suspect, and so the matter is
1. Hypothetical created by the author.
2. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.250-.348 (2000); see id. § 42.17.260(1) ("Each agency, in
accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public
records ... ").
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closed. Under Washington's Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA),3 the
chief argues, nonconviction records may not be released to the public.4
If the same situation were to play out in Eastern Washington, the
opposite result could occur. Instead of relying on the CRPA to deny the
request, the chief there might conclude that the PDA requires the
disclosure of investigative reports from a closed case. The chief might
point to a state court interpretation of the PDA under which a police
report does not enjoy a presumption of privacy after the case is referred
to the prosecutor's office, regardless of the resolution of the case.
The CRPA and PDA reflect Washington's attempts to satisfy two
conflicting principles for the disclosure of publicly held criminal
records. When citizens approved the PDA by initiative in 1972, they
adopted the philosophy that the public has a right to be fully informed
about the actions of its government. The statute's policy statement
reflects this approach:
The people of this state ... do not give their public servants the
right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is
not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining
informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments
that they have created.6
According to the Washington State Supreme Court, courts should look
to this backbone philosophy of disclosure when interpreting other
statutes affecting public records.7 The PDA's purpose, however,
contrasts with that of the CRPA. Passed five years after the PDA in
response to a federal mandate, the CRPA declares that it is state policy
to protect the "completeness, accuracy, confidentiality, and security of
criminal history record information and victim, witness, and complainant
record information."
8
3. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.010-.140 (2000).
4. See id. § 10.97.050; Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wash. App. 245, 260,
989 P.2d 604, 612 (1999) (determining that plaintiff should not have been able to obtain
investigative information from a case that did not yield a conviction), dismissed upon settlement,
140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000).
5. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep't, 139 Wash. 2d 472, 479, 987 P.2d 620, 623 (1999)
("[T]he fact that allegations have not yet been proven is not persuasive of the need to provide
blanket protection for purposes of a defendant's privacy.").
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.251 (emphasis added).
7. See Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 139, 580 P.2d 246, 255 (1978).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.010 (emphasis added).
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As the above hypothetical illustrates, the PDA and CRPA conflict
over the disclosure of information about law enforcement investigations
that have failed to yield a conviction. In interpreting the two statutes,
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals has applied the
CRPA to entire bodies of investigative information 9-potentially
allowing the use of the CRPA to exempt all investigative information
from disclosure when it concerns a nonconviction. 10 Investigative
information can include all records prepared by the police in connection
with an investigation, such as arrest reports, patrol reports, officer
reports, and citation information.1" Although the Washington State
Supreme Court has not ruled on Division I's approach, 12 its cases can
support an alternative construction of the CRPA. Under this alternative
construction, the CRPA does not remove entire investigative files from
the reach of the PDA; instead, it requires the redaction of a narrow
category of protected information before a law enforcement agency
(such as a police department) may disclose those records. 13
This Comment argues that the Washington State Supreme Court
should correct Division I's erroneous application of the CRPA to entire
bodies of investigative information.' 4 The PDA and its limited privacy
rights more appropriately govern the disclosure of investigative
records. 15 The CRPA should govern only "criminal history record
information"-a narrow category of compiled information typically
found on the subject's rap sheet.' 6 Criminal history record information
consists only of a name, a notation of that person's contact with law
enforcement, and the disposition of the incident.' 7 This approach is
consistent with the text of the CRPA. 18 Further, neither federal nor state
legislative history suggests that legislators intended the CRPA's reach to
extend to investigative information. 19 Washington State Supreme Court
9. Beltran, 98 Wash. App. at 260, 989 P.2d at 612; Hudgens v. City of Renton, 49 Wash. App.
842, 843, 746 P.2d 320, 321 (1987), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1014 (1988).
10. Beltran, 98 Wash. App. at 259-60, 989 P.2d at 611.
11. See Hudgens, 49 Wash. App. at 843, 746 P.2d at 320.
12. Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 616 n.10, 963 P.2d 869, 880 n.10 (1998).
13. Barfield v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d 878, 885, 676 P.2d 438, 442 (1984).
14. See infra Part V.
15. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(1)(d) (2000).
16. See id. § 10.97.030(1).
17. Id.
18. See id. § 10.97.050.
19. See infra Part lI.B.
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cases recognize the need to exclude information protected by the CRPA
from investigative information that is otherwise subject to disclosure
under the PDA.20 However, the higher court has not laid to rest Division
21I's expansive interpretation of the scope of that protection.
Part I of this Comment explores the PDA's governance of public
records. Part II addresses the privacy right to criminal history record
information created by the CRPA. Part III provides an overview of the
Washington State Supreme Court's approach to the disclosure of
investigative information, and Part IV discusses the conflicting approach
of Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals. Part V then
argues that the Washington State Supreme Court should curtail Division
I's inappropriate application of the CRPA to investigative information.
I. THE PDA GOVERNS ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS IN
WASHINGTON STATE
Washington's broad PDA allows public access to all records that
relate to the conduct of government,22 subject to a list of narrow
exemptions.23 The PDA exempts police investigative reports only when
their disclosure would harm effective law enforcement or any person's
24
right to privacy. Although the Washington State Legislature can further
define privacy rights that exist within the PDA, the Washington State
Supreme Court has ruled that the statute's underlying policy of
disclosure requires courts to interpret any exemptions to the PDA
narrowly.25
20. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 616, 963 P.2d 869, 880 (1998); Barfield v.
City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d 878, 885, 676 P.2d 438, 442 (1984).
21. See Limstrom, 136 Wash. 2d at 616 n.10, 963 P.2d at 880 n.10 (declining to reconsider
Hudgens without proper record); Hudgens v. City of Renton, 49 Wash. App. 842, 843, 746 P.2d
320, 321 (1987) (applying CRPA to police investigative file), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1014
(1988).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(1).
23. Id. § 42.17.310.
24. Id. § 42.17.310(1)(d).
25. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 139, 580 P.2d 246, 249, 255 (1978).
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A. The PDA Makes All Public Records Available to the Public,
Subject to Certain Narrowly Tailored Exemptions
With narrow exceptions,26 the PDA declares that any record related to
the conduct of government and used by a government agency 27 is
available to the public.28 The statute defines public records as "any
writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or
the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared,
owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of
physical form or characteristics. '' 29 Agencies cannot use the presence of
private information in a record as a justification for refusing to release
the entire record.3° Rather, the PDA requires that officials redact private
information and release the remainder of the record.3'
One of the PDA's limited exemptions addresses law enforcement
investigative records.32 Officials may refuse to disclose investigative
records if withholding the records is essential to (1) effective law
enforcement, or (2) the protection of any person's right to privacy.33 The
PDA instructs courts to construe this right to privacy narrowly, as with
every exemption to the PDA.34 In fact, the Washington State Legislature
amended the PDA35 to emphasize that courts are to focus on the statute's
broad mandate for disclosure of public records. 36  The PDA's
construction clause highlights the narrow character of its exemptions,
26. Section 42.17.310 of the Revised Code of Washington includes fifty-six separate exemptions.
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(l)(a)-(ggg). Relevant to this Comment are sections 42.17.310(1)(d)
(exempting certain investigative records), 42.17.310(l)(c) (exempting taxpayer information when
disclosure would violate the taxpayer's right to privacy), and 42.17.310(1)0) (exempting work
product when sought as part of pretrial discovery). See id. § 42.17.310(1); see also Dawson v. Daly,
120 Wash. 2d 782, 789-90, 845 P.2d 995, 1000 (1993).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(36) (defining the term "public records").
28. Id. § 42.17.260(1).
29. Id. § 42.17.020(36).
30. Id. § 42.17.260(1).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 42.17.310(1)(d).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 42.17.251; see also Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d 389, 392
(1997); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d
592, 597 (1994).
35. Public Records Disclosure-Revisions, ch. 139, sec. 2, 1992 Wash. Laws 564 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.251).
36. Id.
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instructing courts to take into account the statute's policy of free and
open examination of public records.37
B. Courts Interpret Subsequent Laws Altering Privacy Rights Within
the PDA as Subject to the PDA 's Broad Policy Favoring
Disclosure
The Washington State Supreme Court has established that courts
should attempt to reconcile subsequent laws that alter the PDA's
disclosure provisions with the PDA's preference for disclosure.38 In
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe,39 the court considered whether a 1973 law that
specifically exempted certain taxpayer income information from public
inspection 4° amended the PDA.41 The PDA already protected the release
of such data under the provision that exempted disclosure violating a
taxpayer's right to privacy.42 Relying on a rule to treat statutes dealing
with the same subject as parts of "a harmonious total schema,, 43 the
court held that the later law should be construed as a more specific,
supplemental rule to the taxpayer privacy right existing within the
PDA.44 The court did not find the later law to be a "significant
departure" from the PDA, although each involved a different disclosure
standard.45 Reconciling the two statutes into a single scheme, the court
concluded that courts must read the PDA's "strongly-worded mandate
for broad disclosure of public records" into the later law.46 Relying on
the PDA's policy statement, the explanation of the statute from the
voter's pamphlet, and analogous disclosure policies at the federal level,
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3).
38. See Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 139, 580 P.2d 246, 249, 255 (1978).
39. 90 Wash. 2d 123, 580 P.2d 246 (1978).
40. Assessor's Records-Public Inspection, ch. 69, 1973 Wash. Laws 172 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 84.40.020). If found to be an amendment to the PDA, the later law would have
violated Washington's constitution as a legislative attempt to amend a citizen initiative within two
years. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (c). However, in finding no constitutional violation, the Hearst
court relied on a rule of statutory construction from Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wash. 2d
343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968), a case in which there was no constitutional issue. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at
138, 580 P.2d at 245.
41. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 138, 580 P.2d at 254.
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(l)(c).
43. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 138, 580 P.2d at 254 (quoting Beach, 73 Wash. 2d at 346, 438 P.2d at
620) (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. at 139, 580 P.2d at 255.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 127, 580 P.2d at 249.
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the court noted that all of these sources pointed to the law's "expansive
disclosure requirement" and should serve as a guide for reconciling later
laws that affect disclosure.47
The Hearst court also interpreted the scope of a privacy right within
the PDA for the first time, giving it narrow limits48 that have since
become the standard for interpreting all of the statute's privacy rights.49
Because the public records section of the PDA did not initially define the
term "privacy, '50 the Hearst court turned to the common-law test for
invasion of privacy. 5' The court adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' test that information is private only if its disclosure (1) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate
concern to the public.52 Washington lawmakers ultimately codified the
Hearst court's application of the common-law invasion of privacy test.
53
In sum, Washington's PDA requires disclosure of all public records
not subject to an exemption.54 Agencies and courts must narrowly
interpret all exemptions,55 including the limited exemption for certain
police investigative reports.56 Further, the PDA's privacy exemptions
extend only to situations where disclosure of the records would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and the information is not of
legitimate concern to the public. 7 Although legislators may make
additional information private, courts are to reconcile new exemptions to
the PDA with the statute's broad policy favoring disclosure.58
47. See id. at 128, 438 P.2d at 249.
48. Id. at 135-36, 580 P.2d at 253.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.255 (2000) (codifying Hearst's application of common law
invasion of privacy test); Cowles v. State Patrol, 109 Wash. 2d 712, 722, 748 P.2d 597, 603 (1988).
50. Shelby Gilje, Initiative 276 May Have a 'Sleeper,'THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1972, at A8-
A9.
51. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 135-36, 580 P.2d at 253; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
(1976).
52. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 135-36, 580 P.2d at 253; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.255.
54. Id. § 42.17.260(1).
55. Id. §42.17.251.
56. Id. § 42.17.310(l)(d).
57. Id. § 42.17.255; see also Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 135-36, 580 P.2d at 253.
58. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 128, 138-39, 580 P.2d at 249, 255.
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II. THE CRPA GOVERNS THE RELEASE OF CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION
The CRPA restricts the circumstances in which criminal-justice
agencies may disseminate criminal history record information.5 9 The
CRPA defines criminal history record information to include the
combination of data typically contained in a person's rap sheet: a name,
contacts with law enforcement, and the disposition of such incidents.6°
The statute places the most restrictions on dissemination of information
61
not involving a conviction. Passed in response to a federal mandate, the
CRPA closely resembles the model federal law.
62
A. The CRPA Prevents Disclosure of Nonconviction Information
Contained in a Subject's Criminal History
The CRPA contains regulations for disseminating criminal history
record information.63 The statute defines criminal history record
information as the combination of three necessary elements: (1)
identifiable descriptions of a person, (2) notations of arrests or formal
criminal charges, and (3) the dispositions of such charges. 64 Law
enforcement agencies across the country compile this information about
individual suspects and exchange the compilations with other agencies
in response to criminal background checks.65 Agencies typically refer to
these compilations as "rap sheets. 6 6 The same criminal history record
information may also appear in other documents, such as investigative
reports. 67 The CRPA specifically excludes wanted posters, records of
minor traffic violations, and other police records maintained
chronologically rather than by name (such as the daily jail log) from the
definition of criminal history record information.
68
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050.
60. Id. § 10.97.030(1).
61. Id. § 10.97.050(3)-(5).
62. See id. §§ 10.97.010-140; Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. pt. 20 (2002).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050.
64. Id. § 10.97.030(1).
65. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2 0.3 (l)-(p), 20.33.
66. Id. § 20.3(1).
67. Id. pt. 20 app. (explaining the definition of criminal history record information contained in
§ 20.3(d)).
68. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.97.030(1).
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Whether the public may access criminal history record information
depends on its classification. The information can take one of three
forms: conviction records,69 information on current investigations, 70 and
nonconviction data.7' Conviction records relate to incidents with a
disposition adverse to the suspect, 72 such as a conviction, a guilty plea,
or a dismissal after a period of probation or deferral of sentence.73 The
CRPA gives agencies permission to disseminate conviction records
without restriction. 4 The CRPA also allows law enforcement agencies
to disseminate information on current investigations as they see fit.75 The
final category, nonconviction data, includes criminal history record
information that has not led to a disposition adverse to the suspect and
for which proceedings are no longer actively pending.
76
The CRPA places the most restrictions on the disclosure of
nonconviction data.77 If a case is closed without a conviction, an agency
may disclose the criminal history record information only if disclosure is
(1) specified by other statutes; 78 (2) necessary for the provision of
criminal justice services; 79 or (3) related to research, evaluative, or
statistical purposes.80 The CRPA does not specifically prohibit the
dissemination of nonconviction data in other circumstances. However,
its provisions allowing dissemination of conviction records and
information from current investigations "without restriction" 8' precede
the list of circumstances in which nonconviction information may be
disclosed. The list therefore defines the parameters of disclosure of
nonconviction data.82
69. Id. § 10.97.030(3).
70. Id. § 10.97.050(2).
71. Id. § 10.97.030(2).
72. Id. § 10.97.030(3).
73. Id. § 10.97.030(4).
74. Id. § 10.97.050(1).
75. Id. § 10.97.050(2).
76. Id § 10.97.030(2). There is a rebuttable presumption that proceedings are no longer actively
pending when a case remains open for a year without a disposition. Id.
77. Id. § 10.97.050.
78. Id. § 10.97.050(4).
79. Id. § 10.97.050(3), (5).
80. Id. § 10.97.050(6).
81. Id. § 10.97.050(1)-(2).
82. John R. Wasberg, Laws Affecting Police Records, in INFO. BULL. No. 397, at 90, 97 (Mun.
Research & Servs. Ctr. 1979); see also Jones v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 140 Wash. 2d 112,
116, 994 P.2d 838, 841 (2000) ("[S]tatutes should be read reasonably and as a whole."); Wash.
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Individuals have the right to view their own criminal history record
83 A~oinformation, regardless of whether that information concerns current
investigations, convictions, or nonconviction incidents.8 4 However,
individuals may reproduce their own records only to challenge the
85accuracy of the information. Furthermore, the inspection right does not
include access to investigative files or any information other than
criminal history record information.86 In other words, although an
agency must allow individuals to view their nonconviction criminal
history record information, this right of access does not extend beyond
the three components of the CRPA's definition of criminal history
record information.
B. The CRPA Closely Parallels the Federal Regulations That
Mandated Its Passage
Washington legislators adopted the CRPA in response to a federal
mandate. 7 Reacting to privacy concerns, particularly in light of the
increasing use of computers to share criminal justice information,88 the
U.S. Department of Justice in 1975 issued rules requiring states that
received certain federal funding89 to adopt plans to ensure the accuracy
of criminal history record information and to limit its dissemination.9"
The federal government supplied a set of model regulations for this
purpose9' and threatened states with fines for noncompliance, as well as
the loss of federal funds.92 The funding at issue supported the record-
keeping systems that local law enforcement agencies used to share
information.93
Water Power Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Conm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 71, 586 P.2d 1149, 1154
(1978) (noting that the court's duty in interpreting a statute is to make it "purposeful and effective").
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.080.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF SB 2608, 45th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess., at I
(Wash. 1977) (analyzing the bill as of March 22, 1977).
88. TOM DALTON, ANALYSIS OF SB 2608, 45th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess., at I (Wash. 1977) (analyzing
the bill as of April 11, 1977).
89. Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 20.20 (2002).
90. Id. § 20.21.
91. Id. pt. 20.
92. Id. § 20.25.
93. Id.
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In response to this mandate, Washington passed the CRPA.94 During
the legislative process, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly
eliminated provisions that exceeded the mandate of the federal
regulations. 95  Washington's CRPA parallels the model federal
regulations more closely than analogous laws passed in other states.96 In
particular, state legislators adopted the definition of criminal history
record information found within the federal regulations. 97 The CRPA
also limited privacy protections to those in the federal model. 98
C. The CRPA Affects Information Already Governed by the PDA
The text of the CRPA indicates that it applies to information that may
already be subject to disclosure under the PDA.99 Although the PDA
permits copying of public records for any purpose, 100 the CRPA
specifically states that individuals inspecting their own criminal history
records cannot rely on the PDA to copy those records for any purpose
other than to challenge the records' accuracy. 101 The CRPA also
expressly trumps the PDA in its construction clause' 02-nothing in the
PDA's list of exemptions'0 3 may preclude dissemination of criminal
94. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 87, at 1 ("Senate Bill 2608 has been drafted
by the advisory committee to implement the state plan in order to bring the state into conformance
with the requirements of the federal regulations.").
95. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF SB 2608, 45th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess., at 1
(Wash. 1977) (analyzing the bill as of May 3, 1977).
96. Wasberg, supra note 82, at 90, 93. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.010-140 (2000)
with IDAHO CODE §§ 67-3001 to -3011 (Michie 2003), and MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-101 to -602
(2003).
97. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1) ("'Criminal history record information' means
information contained in records collected by criminal justice agencies, other than courts, on
individuals, consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments,
informations, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom .. ") with 28
C.F.R. § 20.3(d) ("Criminal history record information means information collected by criminal
justice agencies on individuals consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests,
detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising
therefrom ... ").
98. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.010-140 with 28 C.F.R. pt. 20.
99. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.080, .140.
100. See id. §§ 42.17.260(1), .270.
101. Id. § 10.97.080.
102. Id. § 10.97.140.
103. Id. § 42.17.310.
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history record information when it is permitted by the CRPA. 104 This
provision indicates that the CRPA is applicable even when it would
allow more disclosure than permitted under the PDA.' 
0 5
D. Several Interpretations of the CRPA Distinguish Investigative
Information from the Criminal History Record Information
Protected by the CRPA
While the text of the CRPA does not draw a specific distinction
between the criminal history record information that constitutes a rap
sheet and the broader information compiled by law enforcement officials
in the course of an investigation, its federal predecessor and other
authorities have distinguished between the two. Information from
Washington's Municipal Research & Services Center indicates that
although some interpretations apply the CRPA to entire police reports,
the "common interpretation of the [CRPA] is that it applies to criminal
histories."' 0 6 The Washington State Office of the Attorney General has
also indicated that the release of police investigative information is
governed only by the PDA, noting in its Open Records & Open
Meetings deskbook that "[i]nvestigative information does not fall within
the definition of 'criminal history record information' as addressed by
the CRPA. 10 7 The comments to the federal regulations on which the
CRPA is based also specify that the regulations do not extend to
investigative information in police reports. 1
08
The U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished a rap sheet's compilation
of criminal history from other investigative information when
104. Id. § 10.97.140. Conviction records, for example, are subject to disclosure without
restriction under the CRPA. Id. § 10.97.030(1).
105. The CRPA's construction clause was added in 1999, within a bill that also required
permanent retention of investigative records relating to sex offenders. See Sexually Violent
Offenses-Records, ch. 326, sec. 4, 1999 Wash. Laws 1696. The bill created a new exemption to
the PDA for these records, and also amended the CRPA to indicate that criminal history record
information appearing in such records is still subject to disclosure when the CRPA requires it. Id.
106. Heidi Ann Horst, Defensive Driving Through the Intersection of the Public Disclosure Act
and the Criminal Records Privacy Act, in INFO. BULL. No. 512, at 5-1, 5-3 n.1 (Mun. Research &
Servs. Ctr. 2002).
107. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., OPEN RECORDS & OPEN MEETINGS: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO OPEN GOVERNMENT § 5.3 (1998),
http://www.atg.wa.gov/records/chapter5.shtml.
108. Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. pt. 20 app. (2002) (discussing § 20.3(d)
and further explaining the definition of criminal history record information).
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interpreting federal public disclosure requirements." 9 In United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press,"1 ° the Court noted that rap sheets contain accumulated private
information about individuals but reveal little or nothing about the
conduct of a government agency. 1' They therefore differ from reports
that detail agency conduct, 1 2 such as police reports that show actions
taken by law enforcement officers in the course of an investigation. The
Court recognized the difference between the scattered disclosure of
information within investigative reports and court records, and the
disclosure of a compiled rap sheet.'1 3 The Court held that rap sheets
were private information outside the purview of the federal Freedom of
Information Act.' 14 The Washington State Supreme Court has held that
such judicial interpretations of the federal Freedom of Information Act
are helpful in construing the State's PDA.' 1
5
In sum, the CRPA regulates the disclosure of criminal history record
information, regardless of whether that information is subject to
disclosure under the PDA. 1 6 The text of the CRPA and the federal
regulations that mandated it indicate that the CRPA applies only to the
combination of information that would appear on a rap sheet: name,
arrest information, and the disposition of that arrest.' 17 Washington state
officials and commentators 18 and the U.S. Supreme Court'19 have also
drawn a distinction between police reports, which are investigative
information, and the brief criminal histories compiled on rap sheets.
109. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
764 (1989).
110. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
111. Id. at 773-74 (holding that disclosure of an FBI rap sheet constituted an unwarranted
invasion of privacy because it did not involve information about a government agency, but records
about a private citizen).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 764.
114. Id.
115. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 128, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978) ("The state act
closely parallels the federal Freedom of Information Act.. ., and thus judicial interpretations of
that act are particularly helpful in construing our own.").
116. See supra Part II.C.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1) (2000); Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R.
§ 20.3(d) (2002).
118. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 107, § 5.3; Horst, supra note
106, at 5-3 n.I.
119. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 764.
Washington Law Review
Although individuals may view their criminal history record information
on rap sheets,1 20 the CRPA prohibits the release of that information to
the general public when it concerns a contact with law enforcement that
fails to yield a conviction. 121
III. BOTH THE PDA AND CRPA AFFECT THE RELEASE OF
POLICE INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION
The Washington State Supreme Court applies the PDA broadly to
police investigative information.1 22 The court has indicated that the PDA
allows the release of investigative information once the investigation is
complete. 123 The court has also affirmed the application of the CRPA to
differentiate protected information from investigative information which
is otherwise subject to disclosure under the PDA.124
A. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Held That Investigative
Information Does Not Enjoy a Presumption of Privacy Once It Has
Been Submitted for Charging
Under the PDA, investigative records do not enjoy a presumption of
privacy once the investigation is complete, regardless of its ultimate
disposition. Although the Washington State Supreme Court initially
extended a categorical exemption from disclosure to the records of all
active cases, 12 5 the court has since held that this categorical exemption
ends when a case is referred for prosecution. 126 In doing so, the court
120. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
122. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep't, 139 Wash. 2d 472, 476, 987 P.2d 620, 622
(1999).
123. Id. at 479, 987 P.2d at 623.
124. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 616, 963 P.2d 869, 880 (1998); Barfield v.
City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d 878, 885, 676 P.2d 438, 442 (1984).
125. Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 574, 947 P.2d 712, 716 (1997) ("We hold the
broad language of the statutory exemption requires the nondisclosure of information compiled by
law enforcement and contained in an open and active police investigation file because it is essential
for effective law enforcement.").
126. Cowles, 139 Wash. 2d at 479-80, 987 P.2d at 623 ("[W]e hold in cases where the suspect
has been arrested and the matter referred to the prosecutor, any potential danger to effective law
enforcement is not such as to warrant categorical nondisclosure of all records in the police
investigative file.").
Vol. 79:693, 2004
Disclosure of Nonconviction Information
indicated that an unresolved investigation is not itself persuasive of a
right to privacy in the investigative information.1
27
For a short period in the 1990s, a Washington State Supreme Court
decision severely limited public access to investigative records. In
Newman v. King County,128 the court held that the PDA categorically
exempted from disclosure all investigative information pertaining to
open cases.129 The Newman case involved a reporter's request for access
to the King County Department of Public Safety file on the twenty-five-
year-old, unsolved murder of civil rights leader Edwin Pratt. 30 The
county declined to release anything beyond the initial incident report,
citing the PDA exemption for records essential to effective law
enforcement. 13' The county also argued that disclosure would violate the
privacy rights of witnesses, suspects, and defendants.'
32
The Washington State Supreme Court agreed with the county and
established a categorical exemption from the PDA for disclosure of
"open and active" police files. 133 The court based its holding on the
PDA's effective law enforcement exemption, however, and did not
address the county's privacy argument under the PDA. 13 4 In addition, the
court did not address whether the CRPA would affect the privacy of the
investigative information.
Two years later, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the
Newman decision's categorical exemption for effective law enforcement
ends when a case is referred to the prosecutor for a charging decision.'
35
The newspaper plaintiff in Cowles Publishing Co. v. Spokane Police
Department'36 requested the incident report and booking photo from the
DWI arrest of an assistant city attorney. 37 On the same day as the arrest,
127. Id. at 479, 987 P.2d at 623 ("[T]o the extent protection of the trial process or the privacy
rights of a suspect are essential in any given case, the trial court should make that factual
determination on a case-by-case basis.").
128. 133 Wash. 2d 565, 947 P.2d 712 (1997).
129. Id. at 574, 947 P.2d at 716.
130. Id. at 568, 947 P.2d at 713.
131. Id. at 570, 947 P.2d at 714 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(1)(d) (2000)).
132. Id. at 572, 947 P.2d at 715.
133. Id. at 574, 947 P.2d at 716.
134. See id. at 571-74, 947 P.2d at 715-16.
135. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep't, 139 Wash. 2d 472, 477-78, 987 P.2d 620, 622
(1999).
136. 139 Wash. 2d 472, 987 P.2d 620 (1999).
137. Id. at 474-75, 987 P.2d at 621.
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the police department referred the case to the prosecutor and requested
that charges be filed. 138 The court held that once investigators submit a
case for a charging decision, withholding disclosure of the investigation
is no longer essential to effective law enforcement.' 39 The court noted
that "[i]n such circumstances, the risk of inadvertently disclosing
sensitive information that might impede apprehension of the perpetrator
no longer exists."
' 140
Unlike the Newman decision, the court in Cowles also directly
addressed the suspect's privacy interest in criminal investigative
information, though only with respect to the PDA.14' The court held that
nothing in the police report implicated the privacy prong of the PDA's
investigative records exemption. 142 Emphasizing that the public is "well
aware" of the presumption of innocence, the court stated that the fact
that allegations are unproven does not alone justify a blanket protection
for privacy. 1
43
The Cowles decision did not discuss the CRPA. Although the CRPA
may implicate the privacy of criminal history record information
contained within investigative records, the trial court had held that the
CRPA did not prevent the release of the records, 144 and the city did not
appeal that issue. 145 However, the court's interpretation of the PDA
shows the limited nature of a person's right to privacy in any
investigative information.
138. Id. at 475, 987 P.2d at 621.
139. Id. at 479-80, 987 P.2d at 623.
140. Id. at 477-78, 987 P.2d at 622.
141. Id. at 479, 987 P.2d at 623.
142. Id. at 480, 987 P.2d at 624.
143. Id.
144. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep't, No. 97-2-03783-7 (Super. Ct. Spokane County
Aug. 25, 1997) (judgment and order requiring disclosure of public records).
145. See Appellant's Brief, Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep't, 92 Wash. App. 1018
(1998) (No. 16870-1-111). Because the CRPA permits law enforcement agencies to disclose
information about current investigations at their discretion, the privacy right created by the CRPA
would not affect records of an open investigation, such as in Cowles. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.97.050(2) (2000).
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B. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Peripherally Addressed
the CRPA 's Construction, Leaving the Extent of Its Right to
Privacy Unclear
The Washington State Supreme Court has indicated that the CRPA
affects the release of investigative information under the PDA, but has
not clarified the limits of the CRPA's right to privacy. In Barfield v. City
of Seattle,146 the court held that police internal investigation files were
not privileged from disclosure under the PDA. 147 The defendants sought
the files during discovery in two civil suits against police officers. 148 In
both cases, the court determined that the police department had not
shown that disclosure of the files would violate anyone's right to privacy
under the PDA's investigative records exemption. 149 In addition, the
court cited the CRPA in affirming the trial court's decision to delete
from the files "all criminal records."'
150
In short, the court interpreted the CRPA to provide a right to privacy
that exempted information otherwise subject to disclosure under the
PDA. However, the court did not clarify whether it considered "all
criminal records" to include any information related to a criminal case,
or only criminal history record information as defined by the CRPA.' 5'
The decision did recognize that the PDA and CRPA impose different
requirements on investigative information. 52 Although the Barfield
court failed to explain precisely what type of information agencies
should withhold, the case establishes that agencies can reconcile the two
statutes by separating information that fits under the CRPA's narrower
privacy right from information that does not.1 5
3
The court has also affirmed a similar interpretation of the CRPA by
Division II of the Washington State Court of Appeals, but again the high
court left the extent of the CRPA's protection unclear. 154 In Limstrom v.
146. 100 Wash. 2d 878, 676 P.2d 438 (1984).
147. Id. at 885, 676 P.2d at 442 (noting that the files were, however, subject to a protective order
by the court).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See id
154. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 85 Wash. App. 524, 532-33, 933 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1997), rev'd
on other grounds, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 617, 963 P.2d 869, 880 (1998).
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Ladenburg,155 a defense attorney sought prosecution files that contained
investigative records involving a certain sheriffs deputy.156 Division II
reversed a trial court's decision that the PDA's work-product exemption
protected the records from disclosure. 57 The appellate court also noted
that it was improper for the prosecutor's office to make a blanket claim
of exemption for the records under the CRPA because the office made
no attempt to withhold only nonconviction information. 58 On appeal,
the Washington State Supreme Court agreed. 159 The court remanded the
case with instructions for the trial court to determine whether the CRPA
protected some of the information from disclosure.' 60 While indicating
that the CRPA protected the nonconviction information among the
requested records,' 6' the court again failed to specify whether that
protected information included investigative records, or merely rap sheet
information.
The Washington State Supreme Court's holdings in both Barfield and
Limstrom support the conclusion that data protected by the CRPA
should not be disclosed along with other public records. However, the
court has left the scope of the information protected by the CRPA
unclear. In a footnote to its Limstrom opinion, the court recognized that
it has not yet considered the interpretation of the CRPA adopted by
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals. 62 Stating that the
Limstrom case presented an insufficient record, the Washington State
Supreme Court refused to address the issue. 1
63
IV. DIVISION I HAS RELIED ON THE CRPA TO GOVERN
DISCLOSURE OF ENTIRE INVESTIGATIVE FILES
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals has applied the
CRPA not only to criminal history record information as defined by the
155. 85 Wash. App. 524, 933 P.2d 1055 (1997), rev'don other grounds, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 963
P.2d 869 (1998).
156. Id. at 528, 933 P.2d at 1057.
157. Id. at 532, 933 P.2d at 1059.
158. Id. at 532-33, 933 P.2d at 1059.
159. Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 615, 963 P.2d 869, 879 (1998).
160. Id. at 615-16, 963 P.2d at 879-80.
161. Id. at 616, 963 P.2d at 880.
162. Id. at 616 n.10, 963 P.2d at 880 n.10.
163. Id.
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statute, 164 but also to entire bodies of investigative information. 165 This
approach differs from that set forth by the Washington State Supreme
Court in the Barfield and Limstrom decisions. In those cases, the court
affirmed the exclusion of information protected by the CRPA from
otherwise public investigative information. 166  The higher court,
however, has not reviewed the cases in which Division I interpreted the
CRPA.
167
A. Division I Applied the CRPA to an Entire Investigative File in
Hudgens v. City of Renton
In Hudgens v. City of Renton, 168 Division I of the Washington State
Court of Appeals determined that the CRPA's provisions applied to an
entire investigative file. 169 "Free-lance newsman" Harley Hudgens
requested access to every record prepared by the Renton Police
Department in connection with the DWI arrest of a suspect who had
been tried and found not guilty. 170 Because of the acquittal, 171 criminal
history record information about the case fit the CRPA's definition of
nonconviction information.' 72 Division I's holding, however, extended
the CRPA's protection to the entire investigative file, 173 not just the three
elements of criminal history record information. 174
The Hudgens court, however, limited the reach of the CRPA in one
important respect. The court held that the CRPA prevented the copying
of the documents, but did not prohibit their inspection by a third party.'
75
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1) (2000).
165. Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wash. App. 245, 260, 989 P.2d 604, 612
(1999), dismissed upon settlement, 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000); Hudgens v. City of
Renton, 49 Wash. App. 842, 844-45, 746 P.2d 320, 321-22 (1987), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d
1014 (1988).
166. See Barfield v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d 878, 885, 676 P.2d 438, 442 (1984); Limstrom,
136 Wash. 2d at 616, 963 P.2d at 880.
167. Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000)
(dismissing upon settlement); Hudgens v. City of Renton, 110 Wash. 2d 1014 (1988) (denying
review).
168. 49 Wash. App. 842, 746 P.2d 320 (1987), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1014 (1988).
169. Id. at 843, 746 P.2d at 321-22.
170. Id. at 843, 746 P.2d at 321.
171. Id.
172. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(2) (2000).
173. See Hudgens, 49 Wash. App. at 844, 746 P.2d at 321.
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1).
175. Hudgens, 49 Wash. App. at 844-45, 746 P.2d at 321-22.
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The court's analysis relied on a close reading of the CRPA's "Inspection
of Information by Subject" provision, 176 which specifies that "[n]o
person shall be allowed to retain or mechanically reproduce any
nonconviction data."177 Based on this provision, the court concluded that
"nothing in the statute prohibits the viewing or inspection of
nonconviction information.''
178
Although the investigative file received protection from copying
under the CRPA, the court held that the PDA's investigative records
exemption did not provide any supplemental privacy. 179 The court stated
that because the city had not met its burden of showing that release of
the file would be highly offensive and outweigh the public's interest in
disclosure, the information was not exempt from disclosure. 180 The court
therefore held that all of the information in the investigative file should
be accessible for viewing under the PDA, but could not be reproduced
under the CRPA.1
8 1
Thus, the Hudgens decision expanded the scope of information
covered by the CRPA while simultaneously decreasing the level of
protection it provides. The decision broadened the application of the
CRPA to entire investigative files, 182 but limited its protection to
preventing only physical retention or copying of protected
information. 183 By applying the PDA's privacy standard, the court
preserved the PDA's broad mandate for access to public records. 8 4 In
the wake of Hudgens, a Seattle assistant city attorney opined that cities
can "skip analysis under CRPA and analyze a request for non-conviction
data under the provisions of the PDA."' 85 The Washington State
Supreme Court denied review of the Hudgens decision,' 86 but has
176. Id. at 844, 746 P.2d at 321.
177. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.080.
178. Hudgens, 49 Wash. App. at 845, 746 P.2d at 321.
179. Id. at 846, 746 P.2d at 322.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 844-46, 746 P.2d at 321-22.
182. Id. at 843-44, 746 P.2d at 321.
183. Id. at 844-45, 746 P.2d at 321.
184. See id. at 845-46, 746 P.2d at 322; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.010(11) (2000).
185. James Pidduck, Confidentiality of Police Personnel Records and Other Police Records
Under the Public Disclosure Act (ch. 42.17 RCW) and the Washington State Criminal Records
Privacy Act (ch. 10.97 RCW), in INFO. BULL. No. 458, at 18, 20 (Mun. Research & Servs. Ctr.
1989).
186. Hudgens v. City of Renton, 110 Wash. 2d 1014 (1988).
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indicated that it may reconsider the appellate court's interpretation of the
CRPA if provided with a sufficient record.187
B. Applying the CRPA in Beltran v. State Department of Social and
Health Services, Division I Left It Unclear Whether Access to
Nonconviction Investigative Information Is Ever Permissible
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals has since
followed the Hudgens decision by applying the CRPA to investigative
information. 188 However, in doing so, the court has sealed this kind of
information instead of making it accessible.1 89 In Beltran v. State
Department of Social and Health Services,'9" the plaintiff sought to use
investigative information about nonconviction criminal activity in a
foster home to show that the state was negligent in licensing the foster
parent. 191 The court held that the dissemination of such information by
the Department of Social and Health Services to a third party would
violate the foster parent's privacy right under the CRPA. 192 The court
affirmed the trial court's order to seal the investigative information and
strike it from the trial record.
9 3
The court's decision in Beltran left it uncertain whether the CRPA
permits the public to access nonconviction investigative information at
all. 194 Noting that the Hudgens decision prohibited the reproduction of
investigative information, the court held that the Beltran plaintiffs
reproduction for evidentiary purposes was improper.195 However, the
court's language did not clarify whether the plaintiff, a third party not
involved in the police investigation, should even have been allowed to
view the investigative information. 196 "Beltran does not fall within any
187. Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 616 n.10, 963 P.2d 869, 880 n.10 (1998)
("Without a sufficient record, we decline to consider whether we agree with the interpretation of
[the CRPA] as articulated in Hudgens .... ).
188. Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wash. App. 245, 259-60, 989 P.2d 604,
611-12 (1999), dismissed upon settlement, 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000).
189. Id.
190. 98 Wash. App. 245, 989 P.2d 604 (1999), dismissed upon settlement, 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10
P.3d 405 (2000).
191. Id. at 259,989 P.2dat 611.
192. Id. at 259-60, 989 P.2d at 612.
193. Id. at 260, 989 P.2d at 612.
194. See id. at 259, 989 P.2d at 612.
195. Id. at 260, 989 P.2d at 612.
196. See id.
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of the exceptions provided in the Act for those who are allowed access
to this type of information," the court wrote. 9 7 The court held that
dissemination of the information was therefore unlawful, and that the
trial court properly ordered it stricken from the record and sealed. 198 The
language of the opinion was ambiguous as to whether the sealing
pertained to the record in the case at bar or to all future public access.199
Although the Washington State Supreme Court granted review of
Beltran, the parties settled, and the higher court never heard the case.'
°°
In sum, Division I's interpretation of the CRPA could prevent access
to investigative information.20 1 Further application of the CRPA in this
manner could make all investigative information resulting in a
nonconviction inaccessible to the public, not just the criminal history
record information about the incident.20 2 Although the Washington State
Supreme Court did not review the cases establishing this precedent,20 3
the court has shown the willingness to reconsider Division I's
interpretation of the CRPA.204
197. Id. at 259, 989 P.2d at 612.
198. Id.
199. See id. ("Beltran was not authorized to obtain the information and the trial court properly
remedied the unlawful dissemination of the information by ordering it to be stricken from the record
and sealed."). Division I has applied the CRPA to records beyond the statute's definition of criminal
history record information in two unpublished opinions since Beltran. State v. Soliz (In re Detention
of Soliz), No. 44127-2-1, 2000 WL 965007, at *2, *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. I July 3, 2000); In re
Detention of Thorell, No. 42237-5-I, 2000 WL 222815, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. I Feb. 22, 2000).
In both cases, however, the court held disclosure to be permissible based on another statute
requiring the Department of Corrections to disclose certain information about sexually violent
predators to prosecutors. See Soliz, 2000 WL 965007, at *2, *9 (holding that release of police
reports, Department of Corrections files, and mental health reports to psychologist was permissible
under Washington Revised Code § 10.97.050(4)); Thorell, 2000 WL 222815, at *7 (holding that the
same statutory provision permitted dissemination of Department of Corrections file). Since Beltran,
the court has not considered the CRPA in a case where only the PDA supports disclosure.
200. Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000).
201. See Beltran, 98 Wash. App. at 259-60, 989 P.2d at 611-12; see also supra notes 194-99 and
accompanying text.
202. See Beltran, 98 Wash. App. at 259-60, 989 P.2d at 611-12; see also supra notes 194-99 and
accompanying text.
203. Beltran, 140 Wash. 2d at 1021, 10 P.3d at 405 (dismissing upon settlement); Hudgens v.
City of Renton, 110 Wash. 2d 1014 (1988) (denying review).
204. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 616 n.10, 963 P.2d 869, 880 n. 10 (1998).
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V. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
CURTAIL DIVISION I'S APPLICATION OF THE CRPA
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals has
inappropriately extended the reach of the CRPA to entire bodies of
investigative information.2 0 5 The Washington State Supreme Court could
more appropriately reconcile the PDA and CRPA by redacting the
narrow area of criminal history record information protected by the
CRPA from investigative information that is otherwise publicly
available under the PDA.2°6 This interpretation is supported by the text
of the CRPA, which indicates that protected criminal history record
information consists strictly of the three components of a rap sheet.2°7
Further, the federal regulations that mandated the CRPA are explicitly
inapplicable to investigative information. The intended construction of
the CRPA is to regulate the disclosure of rap sheet information only.20 8
Division I's interpretation is also inconsistent with the Washington State
Supreme Court's narrowing of the privacy of investigative information
under the PDA.20 9 The higher court has drawn a distinction between
information that is private under the CRPA and information available
under the PDA; this distinction is consistent with redacting CRPA-
protected information from otherwise public records.
21 0
A. Division l's Broad Use of the CRPA To Address Entire Records of
Nonconviction Investigations Conflicts with the Plain Text of the
Statute
By applying the CRPA to all investigative information, Division I has
expanded the statute's narrow definition of criminal history record
information. While Division I originally allowed the public to view
investigative information held to be otherwise protected by the CRPA,21'
the court has since indicated that the CRPA may prevent all access to
205. See supra Part IV.
206. See infra Part V.D.
207. See infra Part V.A.
208. See infra Part V.B.
209. See infra Part V.C.
210. See infra Part V.D.
211. Hudgens v. City of Renton, 49 Wash. App. 842, 844-45, 746 P.2d 320, 321-22 (1987),
review denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1014 (1988).
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investigative records about a nonconviction incident.212 The plain text of
the CRPA does not protect investigative records, but instead protects a
narrowly defined category of criminal history record information.213 The
CRPA explicitly defines criminal history record information as the
combination of three pieces of data: (1) identifiable descriptions of a
person, (2) notations of arrests or formal criminal charges, and (3) the
dispositions of those charges.214 Only when this information relates to a
nonconviction incident does it have the potential to be private under the
CRPA.215 The statute does not protect information outside this
definition.216
The CRPA's "Inspection of Information by Subject" provision further
demonstrates the statute's distinction between criminal history record
information and other investigative information.21 7 This provision
explicitly grants individuals the right to review their own criminal
history record information. 1 8 However, the provision also indicates that
the personal right of access extends only to criminal history record
information, and not to investigative files.219 By distinguishing protected
criminal history record information from unprotected investigative
information, the CRPA indicates that investigative data falling outside of
the three-part definition of criminal history. record information is not
addressed by the statute.22°
In line with such textual indications, state officials and commentators
have interpreted the CRPA as inapplicable to investigative
information.221 The Washington Attorney General's Office Open
Records & Open Meetings deskbook specifies that "[i]nvestigative
information does not fall within the definition of 'criminal history record
information.', 222 The deskbook further specifies that the release of
212. See Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wash. App. 245, 259, 989 P.2d 604,
611-12 (1999), dismissed upon settlement, 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000).
213. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1) (2000).
214. Id.
215. See id. § 10.97.050.
216. See id
217. See id § 10.97.080.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id
221. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 107, § 5.3; Horst, supra note
106, at 5-3 n.I.
222. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 107, § 5.3.
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police investigative information is governed by the PDA.223 Information
from the library of Washington's Municipal Research & Services Center
indicates that although agencies apply the CRPA on a case-by-case
basis, they commonly interpret the statute to cover criminal histories
only.224 This predominant interpretation reflects the CRPA's plain
definition of criminal history record information as inclusive only of rap
sheet information rather than entire investigative files. In applying the
CRPA to protect investigative information from disclosure, Division I
therefore broadens the scope of the CRPA's text beyond common usage
and understanding.
In addition, Division I's interpretation of the CRPA undermines the
PDA. The PDA states that courts are to promote its policy of disclosure
by narrowly construing its exemptions.225 As the Washington State
Supreme Court has indicated, courts should also follow this policy in
interpreting exemptions passed more recently than the PDA.226 In Hearst
Corp. v. Hoppe, the court held that a law passed after the PDA, which
independently exempted "confidential income data" from disclosure,
supplemented and defined the PDA's existing right of privacy for
taxpayers.227 This interpretation reconciled the two statutes and
permitted the Hearst court to construe them as part of a harmonious
scheme, as mandated by the principle of statutory construction on which
the court relied.228 The Hearst court established that it is appropriate to
reconcile the PDA with its exemptions by broadly construing the PDA's
disclosure policy and narrowly construing its exemptions.229
In a manner similar to the income data exemption addressed in
Hearst,230 the CRPA clarifies an existing exemption by explicitly
designating certain types of private information 231 within the context of
investigative records. 232 Addressing only the narrow category of criminal
history record information,233 the CRPA is not a significant departure
223. Id.
224. See Horst, supra note 106, at 5-3 n.1.
225. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3).
226. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 139, 580 P.2d 246, 255 (1978).
227. Id. at 138-39, 580 P.2d at 254-55.
228. See id
229. See id.
230. Id. at 138, 580 P.2d at 254.
231. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050.
232. Id. § 42.17.310(1)(d).
233. Id. § 10.97.030(1).
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from the public disclosure mandate of the PDA. Courts should therefore
interpret the CRPA as a later exemption to the PDA. Thus, courts should
read the CRPA in concert with the PDA's "strongly worded mandate for
broad disclosure of public records." 234 This interpretation reconciles and
gives effect to both statutes, in line with the Hearst decision.235
In sum, Division I is not interpreting the CRPA in accord with its
intended construction. The statute's exemption for nonconviction
criminal history record information 236 is a specific and supplemental rule
that defines the PDA's privacy right in investigative records. When
Division I applies the CRPA not only to criminal history record
information, but also to entire investigative files that contain that data,237
it employs an inappropriately broad reading that contravenes the
Washington State Supreme Court's approach of reconciling the PDA
and its later exemptions.238
B. The Federal Regulations Mandating Washington's CRPA Provide
Guidance for Judicial Interpretation of the Statute
The federal regulations that served as a model for the CRPA also
indicate that Division I has misapplied the statute. The Washington State
Supreme Court has shown its willingness to look to federal disclosure
law by using interpretations of the federal Freedom of Information Act
for guidance in construing the PDA.239 The text of the CRPA closely
parallels the U.S. Department of Justice regulations that mandate it.
240
The Department of Justice intended those regulations to protect the
privacy of the rap sheet information shared between law enforcement
agencies, not investigative information that is the work product of law
enforcement officers.24
234. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 127, 580 P.2d at 249.
235. See id at 138, 580 P.2d at 254-55.
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(2).
237. See Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wash. App. 245, 259-60, 989 P.2d
604, 612 (1999), dismissed upon settlement, 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000); Hudgens v.
City of Renton, 49 Wash. App. 842, 843-46, 746 P.2d 320, 321-22 (1987), review denied, I 10
Wash. 2d 1014 (1988).
238. Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 139, 580 P.2d at 254-55.
239. Id. at 128, 580 P.2d at 249.
240. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.010-.140 with Criminal Justice Information Systems,
28 C.F.R. pt. 20 (2002).
241. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.3(1)-(p), 20.33; see also id. pt. 20 app. (discussing the definition of
criminal history record information contained in 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(d)).
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The drafters of the federal regulations specified in their appendix that
investigative information, or all other information contained in criminal
justice agency reports, is not criminal history record information,242 and
is thus beyond the scope of the model regulations. In text essentially
identical to the federal regulations, Washington's CRPA also defines
criminal history record information to consist of the three basic
components of a rap sheet.243 By not changing the language of the
federal model law, Washington legislators implicitly adopted the
appendix that came with the federal rules. Further, the legislative history
behind the statute indicates that the state merely responded to the federal
mandate, and did not expand upon it.244 If the legislature had an
independent, broader interest in concealing investigative information,
that interest is reflected neither in the text of the statute nor in the
statute's legislative history.
Division I's application of the CRPA to investigative information is
similarly misaligned with the purpose of the federal mandate as shown
in additional legislative history. The federal mandate that inspired the
CRPA was a response to the increasing use of computers by criminal
justice agencies. 245 As an incentive to those states that passed the
requested legislation, the federal government promised funds for local
record-keeping systems used to share information between agencies. 246
This indicates that the chief federal concern was the accuracy and
privacy of the rap sheet information shared electronically in response to
requests for criminal histories. 247 Rap sheets only include names paired
with notations of arrests and their dispositions248-the criminal history
record information the CRPA purports to regulate.249
The U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press provides
further guidance as to the difference between rap sheets and
242. 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.3(1)-(p), 20.33; see also id pt. 20 app. (discussing the definition of criminal
history record information contained in 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(d)).
243. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1).
244. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 95, at 1; see also text accompanying supra
note 95.
245. DALTON, supra note 88, at 1.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.; see also Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(1) (2002).
249. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.030(1), .050 (2000).
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investigative information.250 The decision confirmed that very different
privacy considerations affect the release of rap sheets and the release of
investigative information. 25' The Court stated that rap sheets contain
accumulated private information that does not reflect on the conduct of
government.252 Thus, the combined elements of criminal history record
information that would appear on a rap sheet are different from records
such as police reports. Investigative reports are generally public under
federal disclosure law, even when those reports contain information that
could be compiled onto a rap sheet.253 Including investigative
information within the CRPA's coverage similarly conceals from public
view not only criminal history record information about an individual,
but also the work product of law enforcement officers.25 4 This
interpretation expands the effect of the CRPA beyond individual privacy
to the conduct of public agencies and the behavior of their employees-
precisely the information the PDA was intended to bring into public
255
view.
The Washington State Supreme Court has looked to interpretations of
federal public records law to understand the meaning of Washington's
PDA.256 The court should likewise look to the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis of rap sheet information and prevent Division I from subverting
the PDA's purpose with an overbroad application of the CRPA. The
federal judicial interpretation, as well as the federal legislative history of
the model law, demonstrates the distinction between the privacy of rap
sheet information and the disclosure of investigative information. This
distinction supports the use of the CRPA to redact rap sheet information
from investigative information that is otherwise public.
250. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773-74 (1989).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 773.
253. See id. at 764.
254. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(36) (applying to "any writing containing information
relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary
function"); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 773.
255. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(1).
256. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 128, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978).
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C. Cowles Publishing Co. v. Spokane Police Department Supports
Access to Investigative Records over Privacy
Division I's narrowing of the public's right to access investigative
information is contrary to the Washington State Supreme Court's
holding in Cowles Publishing Co. v. Spokane Police Department, which
expanded the circumstances when agencies must release that
information.257 Although the CRPA was not a factor in the case, Cowles
broadened the public's right to access investigative records under the
PDA.258 In limiting the Newman prohibition on disclosure of all open
and active case records,259 the Cowles court rejected the idea that the
defendant possessed an absolute right to privacy in the particulars of his
arrest after his case had been referred to the prosecutor.26°
The Cowles decision established a presumption that all information is
subject to disclosure once a case is submitted for a prosecution decision,
even if the information may later become nonconviction information
protected by the CRPA. 261 The court also presented a rationale for this
result, noting that the public is generally aware of the presumption of
innocence before adjudication. 62 By establishing that investigative
information is not generally private before it becomes nonconviction
information,263 the Cowles court indicated that the PDA provides no
reason why it should become private after a failure to convict.264
Therefore, the narrower right to privacy within the CRPA265 should not
be applied to contravene the PDA by preventing disclosure of such
investigative information across the board.
257. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep't, 139 Wash. 2d 472, 477-78, 987 P.2d 620, 622
(1999).
258. Id. at 479-80, 987 P.2d at 623-24.
259. Id. at 477-79, 987 P.2d at 622-23.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 481, 987 P.2d at 624.
262. Id. at 479, 987 P.2d at 623.
263. Id. at 481, 987 P.2d at 624.
264. See id.
265. See supra Part V.A-B.
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D. The Washington State Supreme Court Can Best Reconcile the
CRPA and PDA by Redacting Protected Criminal History Record
Information from Investigative Records That Are Otherwise Public
Redacting information protected by the CRPA from information that
is public under the PDA satisfies both statutes. The PDA requires
redaction when private information appears in an otherwise public
record. 66 This approach is consistent with Washington State Supreme
Court precedent that acknowledges a distinction between the information
protected by the two statutes. 267 Redaction is also the solution that best
applies the two statutes as a harmonious scheme, in accord with the
Washington State Supreme Court's approach of reconciling the PDA's
mandate for disclosure with later exemptions to the law.268
The text of the PDA supports the solution of redacting protected
nonconviction criminal history record information from public files,
permitting access to the remaining information. 269 The presence of a
piece of private information in an otherwise public record is not a
justification for withholding the entire record270 in the manner that
Division I has suggested that entire investigative records may be
withheld.27' Rather, the PDA requires that officials redact private
information and release the remainder of the record.2 72 The CRPA
273governs only the disclosure of criminal history record information.
The statute prohibits the disclosure of criminal history record
information only when it concerns a nonconviction.27 4  When
nonconviction criminal history record information appears in
investigative records that are public under the PDA, agencies should
therefore redact it. Under this approach, the information protected by the
CRPA remains private, while remaining investigative information is
available to the public.
266. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(1) (2000).
267. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 615-16, 963 P.2d 869, 879-80 (1998);
Barfield v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d 878, 885, 676 P.2d 438, 442 (1984).
268. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 138-39, 580 P.2d 246, 254-55 (1978).
269. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(1).
270. See id
271. See Beltran v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wash. App. 245, 259-60, 989 P.2d
604, 612 (1999), dismissed upon settlement, 140 Wash. 2d 1021, 10 P.3d 405 (2000).
272. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.260(1).
273. See id § 10.97.050.
274. See id.
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Redaction is consistent with the Washington State Supreme Court's
acknowledgment that the CRPA protects a smaller measure of police
information than the PDA does.275 In Barfield, the court affirmed the
release of investigative records from which "criminal records" had been
deleted under the CRPA.276 As the Limstrom case progressed through the
court system, opinions consistently referred to the possibility of some of
the requested information receiving protection under the CRPA.277 This
shows recognition by the court that protected data could be removed
from files that would otherwise have to be disclosed. The court,
however, has not clarified what information is protected by the CRPA.27 8
The text and history of the CRPA suggest that the statute addresses only
criminal history record information-the three components that appear
on a rap sheet.279 Therefore, redacting this information from otherwise
public records when it concerns a nonconviction would reconcile the
CRPA and PDA in a logical extension of Washington State Supreme
Court precedent.
Redaction also treats the PDA and CRPA as part of a single statutory
scheme. The Washington State Supreme Court has indicated that the
PDA and other laws that create exemptions to it should be reconciled
into a harmonious scheme whenever possible.280 The court accomplishes
this goal by reading the PDA's broad policy of disclosure into later-
created exemptions. 281 Redaction of information protected by the CRPA
would enable the disclosure of the underlying investigative
information-consistent with the PDA's policy and the court's
conclusion in Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe.282 At the same time, redaction
would protect the nonconviction criminal history record information that
283the CRPA exempts from disclosure.
275. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 615-16, 963 P.2d 869, 879-80 (1998);
Barfield v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 2d 878, 885, 676 P.2d 438,442 (1984).
276. Barfield, 100 Wash. 2d at 885, 676 P.2d at 442.
277. See Limstrom, 136 Wash. 2d at 615, 963 P.2d at 879; Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 110 Wash.
App. 133, 136 n.2, 39 P.3d 351, 353 n.2 (2002) (appeal after remand).
278. See Limstrom, 136 Wash. 2d at 616, 963 P.2d at 880; Barfield, 100 Wash. 2d at 885, 676
P.2d at 442.
279. See supra Part V.A-B.
280. See Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 138-39, 580 P.2d 246, 254-55 (1978).
281. Id.
282. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3) (2000); Hearst, 90 Wash. 2d at 139, 580 P.2d at 255.
283. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Washington State Supreme Court should end Division I's
overbroad application of the CRPA, and instead hold that the CRPA
requires redaction of nonconviction criminal history record information
from otherwise public documents. Redaction is consistent with the
CRPA's definition of criminal history record information and the PDA's
mandate that exemptions shall be interpreted narrowly. Neither the
federal nor the state legislative history of the CRPA indicates an
intention to include investigative information within the statute's
exemptions to the PDA. The Barfield and Limstrom decisions suggest a
better approach to the CRPA by separating protected criminal history
record information from documents not otherwise exempt from
disclosure. The Washington State Supreme Court should therefore act to
end Division I's incorrect application of the CRPA that exempts
investigative information from disclosure. Except for the redaction of
nonconviction criminal history record information, courts should not
apply the CRPA to investigative files.
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